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A B S T R A C T   
Should we deploy social robots in care settings? This question, asked from a policy standpoint, requires that we 
understand the potential benefits and downsides of deploying social robots in care situations. Potential benefits 
could include increased efficiency, increased welfare, physiological and psychological benefits, and experienced 
satisfaction. There are, however, important objections to the use of social robots in care. These include the 
possibility that relations with robots can potentially displace human contact, that these relations could be 
harmful, that robot care is undignified and disrespectful, and that social robots are deceptive. I propose a 
framework for evaluating all these arguments in terms of three aspects of care: structure, process, and outcome. I 
then highlight the main ethical considerations that have to be made in order to untangle the web of pros and cons 
of social robots in care as these pros and cons are related the trade-offs regarding quantity and quality of care, 
process and outcome, and objective and subjective outcomes.   
1. Introduction 
Should we deploy social robots in care settings? In this article I 
search for the policy desiderata for social robots in care. This endeavour 
is clearly related to, but also distinct from, the question of how social 
robots in care should behave. It is also related to fundamental questions 
of human-robot interaction, and such questions as what happens when 
we relate socially to robots. By drawing on the literature on social ro-
bots, political theory, and ethics, I provide the grounds for policy for-
mation on the use of social robots in care. 
On the one hand, there are many potential benefits to be had from a 
social robot. Economists and politicians see important demographic 
changes looming, which require a new supply of carers for the increasing 
population of elderly [1]. Robotic engineers see the benefits of providing 
assistance, entertainment, and companionship for people by equipping 
robots with social artificial intelligence, and researchers in the field of 
care have also found evidence of benefits, both physiological and psy-
chological, of using social robots in care situations [2]. 
On the other hand, there are potential negative consequences of 
deploying social robots in care. First of all, they have the potential to 
displace human beings, and human beings may in fact be an important 
factor in providing good care. Social robots that relate to human beings 
may also be harmful if the relations they form with human beings leave 
the humans worse off. Finally, it can be argued that any benefit that is 
observed in the use of social robots is achieved through deception and 
undignified treatment of the cared-for. 
In order to evaluate these pros and cons, we need a better under-
standing of how social robots impact the quality and quantity of care. I 
use and modify a framework for assessing the quality of care though the 
examination of the structure, process, and outcome of care [3]. I show how 
social robots have both positive and negative consequences for all three 
aspects of the quality of care and how a basic ethical framework can be 
used to untangle the various effects of social robots on the quality of 
care. 
I show that the answer to the first question in this introduction de-
pends on whether or not we emphasise the outcome or process of care, 
and whether or not we decide to focus on individual recipients of care or 
the general level of care in society. We also have to consider whether 
those being cared for are the best judges of what a good outcome of care 
entails. 
In sum, I show that the first question is deeply political and can best 
be answered by the tools of political philosophy and ethics. I share 
Coeckelbergh’s [4] concern about implicit assumptions at play in the 
analysis of technology as well as his suggestions that political theory has 
much to offer in debates about foundational political principles. The 
answer to the question of whether or not, or how to, use social robots in 
care situations is dependent on the definition of a good society and the 
role of technology in such a society [5]. This is an attempt to highlight 
the main ethical and political issues involved for a broader audience, in 
particular those involved in politics and the formation of healthcare 
policy. 
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2. Social robots in care 
Robots in care has garnered attention and some commercial success 
over time, partly because of certain demographic developments 
observed in modern societies [6,7]. For example, people grow older, and 
many of the elderly face challenges such as dementia and a general need 
for care [1]. Upholding the ratio of carers to elderly is perceived as a 
great challenge, and it is hoped that robots can meet some of the needs 
created by a shortage of carers [8,9]. According to Fong et al. [10], social 
robots will, for example, ‘assist in health care, rehabilitation, and 
therapy’. 
The social robots I discuss in this article are created to interact with 
people and fulfil certain functions that people normally seek in human 
or animal social companions. Robots, it is argued, may require social 
functionality in order to operate properly when integrated in human 
social settings – particularly when human-robot interaction and coop-
eration is the goal [11]. When the term social robot is used in this article, 
it refers to robots that are socially receptive but not sociable robots, as the 
latter are considered to have ‘their own internal goals and motivations’ 
according to Breazeal [12]. 
While social robots have a physical presence and can be endowed 
with the ability to provide physical assistance such as lifting, holding, 
feeding, etc, I will only consider the social aspect of such robots. Socially 
assistive robots are defined by Feil-Seifer and Mataric [13] as the inter-
section between socially interactive robots and assistive robots. The 
aspects of robots here analysed can include cognitive, but not physical, 
assistance, which means that I do not discuss socially assistive robots in 
their entirety. The type of social robot in question cannot manipulate 
objects or provide any form of physical assistance. It is not a lifter, 
washer, feeder, mover or butler. Neither will it be equipped with sensors 
and other capabilities primarily intended to assist patients with physical 
monitoring and assistance [14]. While the robot cannot assist physically, 
it can provide emotional and cognitive assistance [15]. These three 
forms of assistance are what Johansson-Pajala et al. [16] consider when 
they speak of care robots, and the physical aspect is excluded from the 
current analysis. According to their definition of a personal care robot, 
which specifies ‘robotics that improve the quality of life of humans, on a 
non-medical basis’, the social robots included in the analysis could still 
be considered such robots [16]. Examples of robots that together fulfil 
the same functions as the social robots here analysed are Buddy, Paro, 
Leka, and Cutii [17–20]. 
I consider the type of robots discussed by Sharkey and Sharkey [21] 
and Bradwell et al. [7], which provides companionship in addition to 
basic cognitive assistance. Included in the analysis are current or 
near-future social robots, and their intelligence is as a consequence 
limited. They can interact rather convincingly with other beings, pri-
marily through spoken and body language. There is, however, no strong 
AI or general intelligence present, and these robots are not assumed to 
understand anything in the human sense of the word [22]. 
Coeckelbergh [23] and Sparrow [24] have both described thought 
experiments concerning robot eldercare. They describe counter-factual 
scenarios where the elderly are cared for in facilities where robots 
perform all necessary duties. This article is an attempt to identify the 
core ethical issues invoked by the use of social robots in care, and to 
develop the policy desiderata that follow from the consideration of these 
issues. 
The question, for those developing policies regarding the use of so-
cial robots in care, is whether or not social robots should be deployed. 
An examination of the pros and cons is in order — which arguments can 
be made for and against the deployment of social robots? 
3. Why deploy social robots? 
A premise for considering the deployment of social robots is that it 
must be based on the provision of a tangible benefit. There are two main 
categories of such benefits, namely the increase in the quality or 
efficiency of care [25]. I will consider both categories, each of which 
contains several different arguments. I must also note that in the 
following I examine findings from multiple types of robots (animal-like 
and humanoid) as well as various types of patient groups (elderly, with 
or without dementia, the mentally ill, etc.). This is not to suggest that 
findings are fully transferable between these categories, and I simply use 
this examination to build a strong case for potential benefits of deploying 
social robots in care situations. 
3.1. Increased quality of care 
Quality of care is an issue often discussed but not quite as often 
defined. For example, Johansson-Pajala et al. [16] speak of the need to 
‘facilitate the acceptance and normalisation of care robots in elder care 
for exploiting the benefits such as increased quality in elder care and 
improved independence in everyday life’. The fact that robots can 
improve quality in eldercare is taken as a given, but we must delve a bit 
deeper into both the concept of care and quality. 
Care involves situations in which someone is dependent on assistance 
from others for various reasons, particularly in old age. The provision of 
care is often assumed to be based on a moral claim, either involving in-
dividuals close to a person or society at large [26]. 
Many definitions of care have been attempted, some very broad and 
some very specific [26]. One definition by Bubeck [27] states that ‘[c] 
aring for is the meeting of the needs of one person by another person, 
where face-to-face interaction between carer and cared-for is a crucial 
element of the overall activity and where the need is of such a nature 
that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself’. Care, then, 
is based on the presence of certain needs— ‘those which make us 
dependent on others’ [27]. Bowden [28] further states that caring ‘ex-
presses ethically significant ways in which we matter to each other, 
transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond onto-
logical necessity or brute survival’. 
Such definitions illuminate the problem of the very concept of a care 
robot. The latter definition would, I argue, completely rule out the 
possibility of care robots, but the first may be amended to allow for the 
provision of robot care. If we simply state that care involves the meeting 
of the needs of a person but skip the demand that the carer be a person, 
robots can care. Furthermore, Bubeck [27] states that face-to-face 
interaction between the carer and the cared-for is crucial, and I will 
assume that robots are able to interact face-to-face, while recognising 
that this is a controversial assumption.1 Meacham and Studley [31] 
similarly ask if a robot can care. They believe that it can, as they see care 
as based on the external rather than the internal aspects of the carer and 
the environment. 
In developing policy desiderata for the use of social robots, I begin 
with Donabedian [3] and his three main categories for evaluating 
quality of care: structure, process, and outcome, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Structure involves human and physical resources, such as facilities 
and staff. Process involves an examination of how care is both attained 
and provided. Outcome encompasses measures of the health status after 
care is provided, which involves both objective measures of health and 
patients’ knowledge, behaviour, and satisfaction. This framework lets us 
evaluate the achievement of good outcomes through bad processes, 
good process that do not have the desired outcome, and both objective 
and subjective evaluations of the achieved outcomes. We will now turn to 
some of the potential benefits of social robots in care, as discussed in the 
literature on social robots. 
3.1.1. Improved physiological factors 
In a systematic study of the effects of effects of ‘socially assistive 
robots’, Bemelmans, et al. [25] found positive effects on physiological 
1 See Gunkel [29] for an elaboration of Levinas’s emphasis on face-to-face 
relations related to robots [30]. 
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factors, such as stress levels, in the cared-for. This is presumably ach-
ieved through the same kind of mechanism as those involved in 
animal-assisted therapy (AAT). Such therapy has been shown to calm 
patients and have various other positive effects [32]. 
Furthermore, the cognitive assistance provided by a social robot 
could, for example, lead to a healthier lifestyle by way of assisting in 
healthy eating, suggesting activities, managing medication, etc. Such 
factors could lead to objective improvements in care outcome. Patients 
could become healthier, which could be considered an objective 
improvement in care outcome. 
3.1.2. Improved psychological factors 
A direct consequence of improved physiological health could be 
improved psychological health. This would be an indirect benefit of social 
robots. There are, however, indications that social robots could also 
improve psychological health directly. 
Bemelmans et al. [25] found positive effects from socially assistive 
robots on several psychological factors, including mood, loneliness, social 
connections, and communication. These benefits are also associated with 
AAT, and one of the selling points of social robots, such as Paro the 
robotic seal, is that they do provide the therapeutic effects of 
animal-assisted therapy [18]. The heralded benefits of such robots are 
great, and includes stress reduction, stimulation of interaction between 
carers and the cared-for, improved relaxation and motivation, and 
improved socialisation [18]. 
Furthermore, Moyle, et al. [33] show that companion robots 
increased the pleasure scores of the cared-for. This means that a potential 
benefit of social robots is that they make the cared-for happier in the 
sense that they report higher experienced pleasure. If the care we pro-
vide causes people to report high satisfaction, that is one of the sub-
jective outcome factors involved in evaluating the quality of care. 
I will also note that we need not assume that human (or animal) 
therapy is the measure to which care by robots must aspire. In an ex-
amination of potential benefits of social robots, we must accept the 
possibility that robots with advanced artificial intelligence may provide 
better care. This could be the case if the cared-for preferred not to expose 
their vulnerabilities to other human beings. Some might, for example, 
prefer to have a robot monitor them, for example in the shower and in 
the bathroom, as opposed to having a human caretaker [34]. Another 
possibility is that robots, armed with advanced artificial intelligence, 
could provide more advanced and effective care than human caretakers 
could. 
3.1.3. Empowerment 
While robot help with physical tasks is not considered, robots can 
provide cognitive assistance. This means that they can provide guidance 
regarding the proper time for and amount of medication, they can assist 
in nudging the cared-for towards a somewhat more active lifestyle, they 
can remind the cared-for who their family members are, where they left 
important items, etc. 
This kind of assistance means that a social robot can empower, and 
‘facilitate and enhance older people’s autonomy’ [24]. It would let the 
cared-for be more independent (of other people) than they would 
otherwise be, and it could also allow the cared-for to ‘age-in-place’, 
which could be beneficial both for the cared-for and those who pay for 
the alternative—institutionalised care [35]. In addition, they can 
perform safety functions such as making sure that the oven is turned off, 
and even monitor and report if the cared-for should fall, have a heart 
attack, etc. The latter functions, however, are not part of the social 
aspect of social robots. 
3.2. Improved efficiency of care 
Care is costly, no matter how we look at it. On a social level, it re-
quires vast amounts of resources, both human and material. It is also 
necessary, but most tend to agree that more efficient care, ceteris paribus, 
is preferable to the opposite. If not for cynical reasons and the quest for 
profit, increased efficiency would allow us to provide more care. 
3.2.1. Monetary efficiency 
One claimed benefit of care robots is that they could provide care at a 
lower cost. Sparrow and Sparrow [36] are sceptical of such claims, and 
point out that robots with the required sophistication to perform the 
duties promised are quite expensive. However, let us assume that social 
robots without physical assistance capabilities can be produced rela-
tively cheaply now or in the near future. If we were to achieve a slightly 
reduced demand for human care by deploying such robots, we will as-
sume that this leads to monetary efficiency. 
All sorts of things may be wrong with the all-robotic facility imag-
ined by Sparrow [24], but we cannot automatically assume that the care 
provided in such facilities would be worse than the alternative. One of 
the main reasons for pursuing economic efficiency is that we will be able 
to provide more care for less money. This means that poor societies could 
provide care for those that would otherwise not be cared for, and even in 
rich societies care could be provided for more people for longer periods 
of time and in new situations [37]. 
We cannot assume that the sole goal of making care more efficient is 
either to increase profits from care or use the money saved from care in 
other sectors of society. Increased monetary efficiency is thus considered 
to be a benefit. 
3.2.2. Increased flexibility and human-robot cooperation 
Another potential benefit of social robots is that we might change the 
way care is provided. Social robots need not replace human caretakers, 
but they could assist them [38]. While social robots provide certain 
tasks, human caretakers could provide other tasks for which they pre-
viously did not have time. Care could also be provided faster if humans 
and machines cooperated on the performance of tasks. 
3.2.3. Robot-specific opportunities for care 
Another benefit is seen in situations in which robots have clear and 
obvious advantages over human beings. One such settings would be in 
hazardous situations, for example in poisonous or radioactive settings. 
In a hypothetical setting where care would either have to be provided in 
Fig. 1. Aspects of quality of care [3].  
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such a setting or not at all, a social robot would obviously provide 
benefits. This would be akin to the robots that disarm bombs—taking 
advantage of their immunity, durability, and expendability in order to 
perform tasks that humans either cannot or will not perform. 
In the COVID-19 situation in 2020, the elderly were particularly at 
risk and were isolated in care facilities in large parts of the world. Only 
their caretakers could enter the facilities, and while necessary, this also 
involves the risk of infected caretakers bringing the virus into the fa-
cilities. A social robot alone would not fix this situation, as it could not 
provide any physical assistance. However, it could provide companion-
ship at a time of particular need, in a situation where the cared-for were 
not allowed to meet their friends and relatives. 
3.3. The benefits summarised 
We have seen that there are several potential benefits to be had from 
social robots in care. As to the structural aspects of quality of care, 
increased efficiency, and particularly new opportunities derived from 
such robots’ unique nature could lead to increased structural quality of 
care. This is because structural conditions are improved by freeing up 
resources, opening up for new use of existing resources, and creating 
new arenas of care. 
The main advantages, however, are related to the outcome aspect of 
care. Both objective and psychological factors could be improved by 
deploying social robots. Objective and subjective health status could be 
improved. These could, but need not, be associated. 
Lastly, we could also see improvements in the process aspect of care. 
One possibility is that robots replace human caretakers in situations 
where the cared-for feel particularly vulnerable, but also through more 
efficient care in terms of the access to care and the speed of the provision 
of specific tasks. All aspects of quality of care could potentially be 
positively impacted by the deployment of social robots. 
4. Objections to social robots in care 
Before we decide to deploy social robots, we must also examine the 
possible negative consequences of using such robots in care settings. As 
with the benefits, I here consider potential negative consequences drawn 
from the literature on social robot and robots in general, and I do not 
limit the discussion to the use of robots in care. This approach provides 
us with a broad arsenal of possible objections considered relevant for the 
use of social robots in care settings. 
Two main concerns related to human-robot interaction are deception 
and authenticity [38]. In addition to these, there are questions of dignity, 
respect, and recognition [21,24]. Stahl and Coeckelbergh [39] consider 
the effects of healthcare robotics in general, which includes robots 
providing physical assistance. While they consider factors such as 
de-humanisation and deception, they focus more generally on issues 
related to the use of information technology and robotics, such as job 
loss and data ethics (including issues of privacy and data protection). My 
task is aimed at a specific subset of healthcare robotics; the more general 
issues related to information technology and robots are not considered 
here. 
I therefore do not consider issues of machine ethics, understood as the 
examination of how robots should act as subjects [38,40]. Machine ethics 
is of great importance for guiding and evaluating the development of 
social robots, and I support the call for more ethical involvement in 
innovation processes [39]. In this article, however, I search for the 
policy desiderata for social robot in care, and this endeavour is clearly 
related to, but also distinct from, the question of how social robots 
should behave.2 
4.1. Authenticity and human relationships 
A robot is not a biotic being, and there is some concern about re-
lations with social robots not being authentic or meaningful [36,41]. The 
objection is based on two related, but different, concerns. The first is that 
relationships with robots may change human beings. The second is that 
human beings have a need for human contact and relationships, and that 
the introduction of social robots will crowd out human contact. 
While the relationships between humans and robots have been 
studied for a long time, there is still a lack of certainty with regard to the 
consequences of forming relations with robots [21,29]. Turkle [41] 
examines how easily we form social bonds with machines and how much 
we seem to enjoy them, but asks, ‘What if a robot companion makes us 
feel good but leaves us somehow diminished?’ This strikes at the core of 
the benefit of differentiating between objective and subjective outcomes. 
This objection is also related to a purported need for human contact. 
One way of approaching this problem is to consider Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs and what he calls social or belonging needs [42]. Some also speak 
of a need to relate to others and that a lack of such relations leads to 
mental disintegration [43]. Such objections assume that robots cannot 
fulfil core companion skills, but there is still an ongoing debate about 
what authenticity really refers to and not least to the potential of social AI 
to develop into what we might perceive as true social companions [44, 
45]. 
4.2. Dignity and respect 
A related factor is what Sparrow [24] calls the human need for 
recognition and respect, ‘which robots cannot provide’. Recognition 
‘consists in the enjoyment of social relations that acknowledge us in our 
particularity and as valued members of a community’, and respect 
‘consists in social and political relationships wherein our ends are 
granted equal weight to those of others in the community’ [24]. The 
question of equal weight to each person’s ends and goals is further 
discussed in section 6, and the concept of recognition is clearly also 
related to the question of authenticity. 
Another perspective on the value of respect is the concept of dignity. 
Sharkey and Sharkey [21] write about the prospect of an erosion of the 
dignity of the cared-for, and relate this to the idea that it is undignified 
for people to be cared for and kept happy through a process that a person 
‘might have abhorred’ had they had full or former mental capacity. 
Some see those with dementia as passing through a second childhood 
and thus see this as reason to treat them like children [46]. Once more, 
we see that there is a fundamental concern about the difference between 
objective and subjective evaluation of outcomes. A person with dementia 
might be perfectly happy playing with a robotic seal—even believing 
that it is real—but some could argue that such an outcome would be bad, 
because this person is not their true self, and that such satisfaction 
should not be the measure used to evaluate the outcome. This can be 
related to Berlin’s distinction between an empirical and an authentic self. 
The former is the person as they appear today, while the latter is some 
potential version of this person [47,48]. The problem, then, is who should 
be considered when evaluating outcomes, the actual cared-for or some 
potential cared-for as interpreted by someone else. 
Carers and relatives are also potential stakeholders worthy of 
consideration, and research shows that they tend to see therapy with 
dolls, for example, as ‘demeaning, patronizing and inappropriate’ [49, 
50]. However, studies show that other relevant stakeholders (children 
and young adults considering the use of robots in care, and specifically 
in the context of elderly family members), have relatively few qualms 
about using companion robots in care [7,51]. In a scoping review of 
research related to the use of PARO in care, Hung, et al. [2] argue that 
the literature contains a gap with regard to user (clinicians, 
policy-makers, families) and patient perspectives on the use of social 
robots in care. 
2 Kochetkova [9] provides an account of the main issues of machine medical 
ethics: "computability, robots as autonomous moral agents, and the relation 
between top-down, bottom-up and hybrid theoretical approaches". 
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4.3. Deception and the willing suspension of disbelief 
Another concern about the use of social robots in care is deception. 
One possibility is quite simply that a person with dementia may not be 
able to distinguish a relationship with a robot from a relationship with a 
living person [21,36]. Another possibility is that the cared-for knows that 
a robot is not a living being, but still cannot help reacting to it as if it 
were [52].3 
Deception is a term defined and used in various ways, and here I 
follow Williams [54] in seeing it as a) a breach of trust by the deceiver 
and b) manipulation by the deceiver of the deceived. However, we also 
need to identify the actors involved when discussing robot deception. I 
assume that a robot itself does not have agency and that it cannot be 
morally responsible for its actions. Someone else owns the actions of a 
robot, and it is this someone who deceives if a robot can actually be used 
for deception. I thus consider the perspective of the cared-for, and 
whether or not they are able to perceive the world around them accu-
rately. The deceived and not the deceiver is thus in focus. The intention 
and even the identity of the deceiver is now of less importance. 
A crucial point is that deception cannot be considered universally 
condemnable unless we simultaneously agree to abandon all sorts of 
games, theatre, movies, etc. Our societies are based in large part on the 
idea of benevolent or prosocial deception [55,56]. Still, we might decide 
that robot deception is not desirable or not desirable in the domain of 
care. However, studies show that robot deception is beneficial in terms 
of achieving higher levels of cooperation between humans and bots in 
games [57]. Traeger et al. [58] also show that robot deception can be 
used to improve human relationships and interaction by strategically 
making robots act ‘vulnerable’ and insecure. 
While deception is mentioned here as a concern, several authors 
point out that social robot deception may in fact be beneficial and even a 
moral imperative if it leads to good consequences [59,60]. Meacham and 
Studley [31] note that human carers will also often be somewhat 
deceptive, and Isaac and Bridewell [61] note that robots need to deceive 
in order to be beneficial. They emphasise the fact that much deception is 
both benign and pro-social. 
4.4. Slippery slope 
A final argument against the use of social robots is based on the idea 
that this will lead to a situation in which robots displace human care-
takers and eventually land us in a dystopia in which the elderly are taken 
care of by machines alone [24,37]. This is a slippery-slope argument that 
will not be assumed to be a logical necessity. I will consider it possible 
for social robots to be introduced into care only where they are bene-
ficial, and agree with the idea that automation is as much about enabling 
humans to work more effectively as replacing human beings directly 
[38]. Concerns related to the displacement of humans by robots and the 
policy implications of this possibility will not be considered in detail 
here [62]. However, viewing social robots as additions to the care set-
tings, and not replacements for humans, require us to provide both the 
resources and education necessary for the care sector to properly deploy 
and integrate social robots in the care setting [6,62]. 
4.5. The negative consequences summarised 
Summing up, the negative aspects of deploying social robots in care 
involve all three aspects of quality of care. First, it may lead to structural 
changes with fewer human beings and more machines. This change, 
however, is only negative if we simultaneously consider and evaluate the 
nature of social robot care. Second, the process of being cared for by a 
robot is highly objectionable to those who view human-robot relations 
as either a) insufficient or b) harmful. Similarly, the process of social 
robot care may involve undesirable forms of deception. Some consider 
the process both demeaning and inhumane. Third, regarding outcome, 
the effects of human-robot relations could be that we are diminished 
[41]. If human contact is in fact a basic human need, the increased use of 
robots in care may lead to the deprivation of basic needs, and mental 
disintegration [43]. I will note that the outcome-related negative effects 
of social robots are largely hypothesised, based on anecdotal evidence, 
and somewhat vague [29]. 
5. The ethics of quality of care 
From the preceding discussion, it follows that all aspects of quality of 
care, as derived from Donabedian [3], can be argued to be both posi-
tively and negatively affected by the use of social robots. Untangling this 
web of pros and cons requires the introduction of an ethical framework 
for assessing and weighing the various arguments—a task to which I 
shortly turn. Before doing so, however, I propose a modification of the 
model for evaluating quality of care. First, I propose that the quality 
factors must be evaluated per person, and that we separate structure from 
the other two, as this aspect is closely connected to the quantity of care 
and should be considered as such, also on a societal scale. This separation 
makes it easier to illustrate the balancing act that is care policy. The new 
model is shown in Fig. 2. 
It is time to examine the core ethical concepts required to evaluate 
the various issues raised thus far. This examination will by necessity be 
brief, and the main idea is to highlight the various concerns that need to 
be accounted for in a policy for social robots in care and in particular to 
elucidate the trade-offs involved. 
5.1. The ethics of outcomes 
Beginning at the end of care, I examine how we might approach the 
evaluation of the outcomes of care. The outcomes, as we have seen, 
consist of both objective and subjective factors. It thus becomes clear 
that it is not simply a matter of weighing process against outcomes. We 
must also decide how to weigh the various forms of outcomes. 
Sparrow [24] proposes that we focus on objective factors of care, as 
people’s own evaluations of their situations may lead us astray. In 
particular, people have desires and preferences that may be objectively 
bad for them, which leads him to argue in favour of a sort of paternalism. 
This assumes that someone else could know better than I do what is good 
for me and thus have the right to override my preferences. This might be 
‘hard’ paternalism, but it is also the basis of ‘soft’ paternalism, like 
nudging [63]. Both Sparrow [24] and Coeckelbergh [60] argue in favour 
of evaluating outcomes by considering the capabilities of the care-
d-for—an objective approach [64]. 
An alternative approach is to consider people’s own judgements and 
preferences. This is the basic idea behind utilitarianism, which involves 
the quest for maximising the amount of happiness, when everyone’s 
pleasure and pain is factored in [65]. Batayeh et al. [66] discuss socially 
responsible innovation in relation to healthcare, and state that this in-
volves moving ‘beyond tradition ideas of patient wellness that are only 
physiological’. While they propose that we include a range of physical 
outcomes, such as financial wellness and overall community wellness, I 
here propose that we could consider the patient’s subjective perception 
of wellness. 
One particular kind of utilitarianism is hedonism. It comes in two 
forms: psychological and ethical. The first is a theory of human moti-
vation, and explains human behaviour as our desire for pleasure (and 
aversion to pain) [67]. The other form, ethical hedonism, is a theory of 
the evaluation of what is good, and it is this form of hedonism we might 
3 When the cared-for actually believes the robot is a living being, this can be 
called full deception. When the cared-for knows that it is interacting with a robot 
but still respond emotionally to the social signals emitted, this can be called 
partial deception [45]. Another set of categories for considering robot deception 
includes the distinction between external state deception, superficial state decep-
tion, and hidden state deception [53]. 
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apply if we want to emphasise the satisfaction of the cared-for, as 
measured by their happiness [68]. 
If we assume that social robots do provide pleasure, as experienced 
by the cared-for, this is considered good in a hedonistic ethic regardless 
of how this pleasure came about. However, when hedonism is coupled 
with utilitarianism, the opportunity to deny a person increased happi-
ness arises if this increase comes at the cost of the general level of 
happiness. 
We must, however, note that utilitarianism and hedonism are related 
but not identical to consequentialism. We could regard criteria other 
than individual happiness as the yardstick with which to evaluate 
various outcomes, such as the capabilities discussed by Nussbaum and 
Sen [64] or some combination of subjective and objective factors. 
One problem, as pointed out by all the sceptics of deception and 
inauthentic relations with social robots, is that such an ethic would also 
accept some outcomes that many of us would consider to be undesirable. 
Sparrow and Sparrow [36], Sparrow [24], and Sætra [37] invoke the 
example of Robert Nozick’s experience machine. This is a machine that 
could provide us with as many life-like experiences we would like while 
we are on life support in some tank [69]. While not actually performing 
any actions in a physical sense, we would experience life as if we did, with 
the added benefit, of course, that everyone could receive experiences 
tailored to maximise pleasure and joy, as scarce goods, wars, difficult 
human relationships, etc. would not come in the way of happiness [37]. 
The relevance of this example hinges on the assumption that 
deceiving the elderly with a robot is similar to the deception created by 
the experience machine. The subjective outcome may surpass anything 
achievable without such deception. The objective outcome, in terms of 
physiological health, for example, will be assumed to be at least equally 
good. Let us assume the elderly will be less stressed and more active due 
to their newfound happiness. The makers of an experience machine will 
certainly also be capable of providing physical stimulation in order to 
keep our bodies from withering while hooked up to the machine. 
If satisfaction is increased and the objective outcome kept stable or 
even improved, what reason could we have to object to such a scenario? 
One answer is process. We could care about how the outcomes come 
about regardless of the actual outcomes, and this takes us to the ethics of 
process. 
5.2. The ethics of process 
How can the process lead us to say that an outcome that a person 
perceives as good is in fact bad? This is where we turn from conse-
quentialist ethics focused on outcomes to deontological ethics of actions 
and process. For a consequentialist, the outcome can justify the means, 
but most deontologists will object to this. 
Let us return to the example of the experience machine, which pro-
vides a good subjective outcome. Nozick [69] nevertheless states that 
being hooked up to such a machine is highly undesirable, akin to suicide. 
The first reason for this is that we want to actually do things and not 
simply have the experience of doing them. This is similar to the objec-
tions based on the value of authenticity and negative effects of decep-
tion. Outcomes and experiences are themselves merely by-products of 
that which is valuable, which is an authentic process where we actually 
live our lives and interact with human beings. However, if the experi-
ences and memories that were produced seem real, what possible reason 
could we have to care about how they came about? 
Nozick’s second reason is that we have a desire to ‘be a certain way, 
to be a certain sort of person’ [69]. If an elderly person were to be 
deceived by a robot seal into believing they were having a social rela-
tionship with a living being, for example, or that they were the captain 
of a pirate ship, and derived great joy from this, they would still not 
actually be the kind of person that they desired. But, again, why should 
we care, if the experience is real to the person in question? Sparrow [24] 
would say that respect would be lacking and that a person deceived in 
such a way had been deprived of recognition. Such a life would, ac-
cording to Sharkey and Sharkey [21], not be dignified. People would be 
happy but they would not be treated as adult and competent beings—-
their happiness would be akin to the happiness produced in children 
when parents tell them that Santa is real. 
Finally, Nozick [69] pre-empts the objections made by many oppo-
nents of the uncritical use of social robots, namely that the human-made 
experiences they produce are fundamentally different from deeper ex-
periences. In order for this objection to be effective, however, we must 
Fig. 2. Modified model of the quality of care.  
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be able to point out exactly how human-made (robot) experiences are 
inferior to experiences produced by natural, or living, entities. We do not 
object to all experience created or assisted with human-made tools. If we 
are to stop social robots in care merely because they are human-made, 
we need more knowledge of just how, if at all, relating to them is 
harmful. Turkle [41] and Darling [70] provide compelling reasons for 
caution, but the harms of relating to robots must be better understood 
and studied if they are to inform policy for social robots in care. 
If we are to disallow outcomes that are experienced as good, we 
could rely on what Nozick [69] calls side constraints. These are compa-
rable to what is usually called individual rights, which is the most popular 
line of defence against unbridled utilitarianism. By appealing to such 
constraints or rights, I could stop you from optimising social happiness if 
that happiness was achieved by breaking some inviolable right. Such 
rights could, for example, be the right not to be killed, coerced, or 
defrauded. We could also add the right not to be deceived and the right to 
be treated with respect. Such rights could be inviolable and not 
amenable to the calculus of utilitarianism [73]. This is akin to the call for 
Kantian ethics in order to prevent the hedonism previously described 
[36]. This would imply that people should never be treated as a means to 
the happiness of others, but always as ends. 
Unbridled hedonism and consequentialism might very well lead us to 
accept us all being hooked up to the experience machine, but inviolable 
rights not to be deceived or given due respect would also lead us into 
troubled water, for example by preventing hugely beneficial applica-
tions of new technologies because they infringe on some set rights [37]. 
6. Decision rules and robot policy 
If we have a desire to create a society in which technology promotes a 
good society, we must determine how such a society treats individuals 
[5]. More than that, however, we must also allow for the fact that every 
society consists of multiple people, and any policy aimed solely at the 
individual runs the risk of having dire consequences for certain groups of 
individuals or even all individuals. 
In general, it seems that social robots in care may have negative 
overall effects on the process of care. This is based on the objections 
which emphasise the beneficial nature of human contact for recognition, 
the need for respect, the value of what is natural (not man-made), and 
the general idea that deception is bad. 
We have also seen that social robots can have beneficial effects on 
both objective and subjective health statuses. They may provide social 
interaction that is experienced as pleasant, which also stimulates so-
ciability and stress reduction in those being cared for. We can imagine 
that use of social robots can lead to physiological and psychological 
benefits. However, we must not assume that such benefits would 
necessarily be maintained if robots completely replaced human beings in 
care. Let us assume that such a situation, as in Sparrow [24], would also 
lead to negative outcomes, caused for example by social needs not being 
met. 
Finally, the question of how social robots affect the structural 
dimension of care is debatable. Sparrow [24] argues that care robots are 
not a panacea that will save the economy of care. However, we have 
assumed that a pure social robot without physical assistance capabilities 
can be quite cheap and that its use will lead to overall economic benefits 
if it allows for a lower ratio of carers to the cared-for. 
Is care of a slightly lesser quality, provided for more people, a good 
thing? Our definition of care describes the meeting of needs, and I will 
assume that the needs in question are non-trivial and that not meeting 
said needs will have substantial negative consequences. A policy must 
define the point at which people should receive care. Providing care for 
more people than those who are in need is not desirable, which means 
that we have a target value for the quantity of care. When this target 
value is reached, we should do whatever we can in order to provide the 
best possible quality of care while maintaining the same quantity. 
In the following I will make three assumptions. First, that the 
financing of the health sector is static. Second, that those who are 
defined as being in need of care have a real need for care, and we cannot 
redefine these needs in order to change the target quantity of care. 
Third, that the society in question does not have the financial possibility 
to provide human care for all in need of care. These assumptions are of 
course highly debateable, but they will allow us to see how the use of 
social robots can be evaluated. 
First of all, social robots are potentially cost-effective, which means 
that they can be employed in order to change the structural conditions of 
care, allowing us to provide care for more individuals. Let us assume that 
this means that we increase the amount of material care resources 
available and slightly reduce the amount of human care workers. 
If this is the only way to provide care for all those in need, the only 
real alternative in this scenario is to state that no care is better than social 
robot care. Since we see potential outcome benefits from the use of social 
robots, this statement will not be accepted. 
After we have used social robots to provide care for all those in need, 
we must decide how best to deploy them and whether or not we should 
deploy more of them. If we assume that a social robot is not better than 
human caretakers, the main reason to introduce more social robots in 
care would be to rationalise the care sector and reduce the amount of 
money spent on care in general, but this is ruled out by the assumption of 
static financing. At this point, we are left to debate the relative benefits 
of human versus robot care. 
We are, however, also at a point where the ethical principles 
involved in the use of social robots become clear. Employing social ro-
bots in care means that some who would otherwise receive human care, 
will receive care that is of slightly lesser quality. However, those who 
would otherwise not receive the care they need will receive much better 
care, even if that care is not optimal. 
From a policy standpoint it makes little sense to refuse the use of 
social robots on the grounds that some individuals would be worse off 
than before. This would not be a case of using people as means for 
achieving the ends for others. If we consider the other alternative, not 
using social robots could mean that we used all those in need of care, 
who would now not receive care, as a means to an end for a lucky few 
who now received human care. 
If we view policy formation as the choice among various scenarios 
for the future rather than the change of actual conditions today, we are 
in a much better place than if we have to consider the negative conse-
quences for the privileged actual people of today. This is also where 
Rawls’s original position and veil of ignorance become useful [71]. 
Without debating Rawls’s premises and what is hidden by his veil, we 
can imagine the original position quite simply as a situation in which 
policy makers meet, without knowing who they themselves are, in order 
to make policy for the use of social robots in care based on the desiderata 
established thus far, as shown in simplified form in Table 1. 
The outcome of such a process depends on an evaluation of the 
various benefit and drawbacks listed, and this evaluation is necessarily 
performed in light of some theory of ethics. It will often be an implicit 
system of ethics, but reaching an agreement on which policy is best will 
be very difficult unless we make the ethical assumptions we employ 
explicit. 
The advantage of the thought experiment that is Rawls’s original 
position is that alternative scenarios can be considered without 
considering the loss of actual persons. In such a situation it is obvious 
that we will not be able to make any reasonable decision without having 
some concern for the overall utility and consequences of our decision. 
Choosing a scenario where only the very best level of care is provided 
would necessarily lead to a lack of care for a vast number of persons, and 
there are no ethical systems that I know of that would suggest such a 
choice. 
Finally, it is important to note that my focus on what Held [26] calls 
the ‘dominant moral theories’ and abstract reasoning is not universally 
accepted as a beneficial approach to the ethics of care or the ethics of 
healthcare robotics. Held [26] herself emphasises the claims of particular 
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others, and believes that abstract and universalistic rules will lead us 
astray. She further states that for ‘most advocates of the ethics of care, 
the compelling moral claim of the particular other may be valid even 
when it conflicts with the requirement usually made by moral theories 
that moral judgments be universalizable, and this is of fundamental 
moral importance’ [26]. Preston and Wickson [72] also emphasise how 
focusing on, for example, the feminist perspective and care ethics will 
lead to a different understanding of the impacts of technology than 
traditional approaches. This, they argue, is also compatible with a range 
of other ethical frameworks. Stahl and Coeckelbergh [39] similarly 
suggest that abstract philosophical approaches to the ethics of health-
care robotics is problematic, as these are too far from the practical as-
pects of innovation of design. I accept these objections to my approach, 
but emphasise that my focus on policy formation makes an abstract and 
philosophical approach to the ethical aspects of social robots in care 
necessary. 
7. Conclusion 
Social robots in care have the potential to result in both positive and 
negative consequences for care. These consequences have important 
implications for the ethical evaluation of the use of social robots and for 
the formation of a policy of social robots in care. I have presented 
Donabedian’s [3] system of the three aspects of quality of care, which 
was modified to become a system for evaluating the quality and quantity 
of care. Structural aspects of care are seen as mainly related to the 
quantity of care while process and outcome are seen as core components 
of the quality of care. It is, of course, possible to state that much care is 
quality care, and the reader can easily make such a move without 
changing the gist of my argument. 
The main potential benefits of social robots in care are related to 
structure (efficiency) and outcome. Social robots have the potential to 
increase care efficiency, thus enabling the provision of more care. They 
also have the potential to improve both physiological and psychological 
factors and the satisfaction of the cared-for. 
On the other hand, the process of care is potentially negatively 
affected by the deployment of social robots, as they may reduce the 
amount of human contact. Robot care may also be undignified and 
disrespectful, and it involves a form of deception. In addition, relations 
with robots may be harmful, which is a factor of the outcome of care. 
In evaluating these outcomes, I have made certain assumptions in 
order to highlight the most important trade-offs that must be made by 
policymakers. The major assumption is that the financing of the care 
sector is static. This implies that we cannot sidestep difficult choices by 
simply allocating more money to the sector in order to advocate against 
the deployment of social robots. Furthermore, the social robots I 
consider are potentially cost effective. 
First, this means that one potential trade-off is some loss of quality in 
order to provide a larger quantity of care. The use of social robots may 
decrease the quality of care, but if this means that more people will 
receive care, this can easily be imagined to be an acceptable trade-off. 
Secondly, policymakers must decide how to evaluate process versus 
outcome. The evidence suggests that social robots may provide outcome 
benefits at the cost of an objectionable process. Should policymakers 
decide that a good process and a strong focus on individual rights to 
respect, dignity, etc. is most important, they may have to accept worse 
outcomes. 
Finally, a crucial question is whether or not to accept people’s own 
evaluations of their situations or if we have a desire to overrule these in 
order to improve objective outcome gains. 
Social robots in care thus have the potential to influence the quantity 
and quality of care, and policymakers should thoroughly examine the 
various aspects presented here. However, the policy desiderata in 
themselves are not sufficient for the formation of policy, as a system of 
ethics is a necessity for making the described trade-offs. This could be an 
implicit and unacknowledged system of ethics. While it could, it seems 
clear that making this system of ethics explicit will make the process 
more transparent, and by consequence possibly more legitimate. 
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